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People can be classified as attracted to both sexes, to men, to women, or to neither sex,
and also as instrumental-expressive, instrumental, expressive, or non-instrumental-expressive.
The two hypotheses tested herein are, on the one hand, the relative independence between
these two typologies and, on the other, the close relation between sexual dimorphism and
sexual attraction, in contrast to the relative independence between sexual dimorphism and
the instrumental and expressive domains. A total of 503 university students (284 women
and 219 men) completed two assessment instruments: The Sexual Attraction Questionnaire
(SAQ) and the Bem Sex Role Inventory (BSRI, 12 items). Analysis of contingency tables
was performed. The results provide empirical support for the hypothesis of independence
of the two typologies, solid support for the relation between sexual dimorphism and sexual
attraction, and clear support for the independence between the gender domains and sexual
dimorphism. The implications of these data for the different outlooks concerning the
relations between sex and gender are established.
Keywords: sexual attraction, sexual orientation, instrumentality, expressiveness, masculinity,
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Las personas pueden ser clasificadas como atraídas por ambos sexos, por varones, por
mujeres o por ninguno, a la par que ser consideradas como instrumental-expresivas,
instrumentales, expresivas y ainstrumental-expresivas. Las dos hipótesis que se van a
poner a prueba son, por un lado, la relativa a la independencia entre las dos tipologías
y, por otro, la estrecha relación entre el dimorfismo sexual y la atracción sexual frente a
la relativa independencia o cuasi-independencia entre aquél y los dominios instrumental
y expresivo. Un total de 503 estudiantes universitarios, de los cuales 284 eran mujeres
y 219 varones, cumplimentaron dos instrumentos de evaluación: el Cuestionario de
Atracción Sexual (CAS) y el Bem Sex Role Inventory (BSRI, 12 ítems). Se realizaron
análisis de tablas de contingencia. Los resultados ofrecen apoyo empírico a la hipótesis
de la independencia de las dos tipologías, un sólido respaldo a la relación entre dimorfismo
sexual y atracción sexual y un claro apoyo a la independencia de los dominios de género
y el dimorfismo sexual. Se establecen las implicaciones de estos datos para las distintas
posturas en torno a las relaciones entre la realidad del sexo y la del género. 
Palabras clave: atracción sexual, orientación sexual, instrumentalidad, expresividad,
masculinidad, feminidad, androginia
Is there any Relationship between Sexual Attraction and 
Gender Typology?
Juan Fernández, María Ángeles Quiroga, and Isabel Del Olmo
Universidad Complutense de Madrid
The Spanish Journal of Psychology Copyright 2006 by The Spanish Journal of Psychology
2006, Vol. 9, No. 1, 3-9 ISSN 1138-7416
We would like to thank the university centers where this research was carried out for their collaboration. We would also like to
thank Dr. Miguel Ángel Mateo for his appropriate and wise comments.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Juan Fernández, Departamento de Psicología Evolutiva y de la
Educación, Facultad de Psicología, Campus de Somosaguas. 28223 – Madrid (Spain). Phone: +34 91 3943162. Fax: +34 91 394 3189.
E-mail: jfernandez@psi.ucm.es. The SAQ is available to any interested researcher upon request (also by e-mail) to the first author. 
Translation: Virginia Navascués Howard
3
Currently, one of the most descriptive, and therefore most
useful, approaches to sexual attraction is the one that classifies
people within a fourfold typology: people attracted to both
sexes, those attracted to men, those attracted to women, and
those who do not patently manifest attraction to either of the
sexes (American Psychiatric Association, 2000). To begin
with, this classification should not be taken as a moral
judgment about the functionality or dysfunctionality of any
of these four categories. This itself implies considerable
progress when compared to the more classic viewpoint, which
considered heterosexuality the normal and logical course of
development for all people (men and women) in contrast to
homosexuality (gays or lesbians) and, especially, to
bisexuality. Nevertheless, these collectives are still struggling
to receive the same or similar evaluative treatment as
heterosexuals (Greene & Croom, 2000). Thus, the path was
cleared to investigate what being heterosexual, homosexual,
or bisexual consist of from a scientific point of view (i.e.,
their determining factors), and to analyze the possible
similarities and differences of each category (also including
individuals who are not attracted to either sex) in a series of
dimensions ranging from intellective dimensions to
personality development dimensions, as well as those of a
more social nature. If researchers could at least have access
to reliable data about the percentage of people belonging to
each of these categories, it would lead to considerable
scientific progress.
Within this broad spectrum of dimensions, those focused
on the complex gender reality are particularly relevant, in
view of the apparently close relationship between gender
and sex (Desrochers, 1995; Finlay & Scheltema, 1991; Green
& Kendrick, 1994). In fact, it is even more pertinent to point
out the confusion of both realities. Thus, in the 20-volume
encyclopedia published by Salvat (2003), the term
androgyny, is defined as equivalent to hermaphrodism, and
the word androgynous is said to be equivalent to masculine
hermaphrodism. The authors seem to have overlooked the
entire international scientific literature on psychological
androgyny, published over the last thirty years, and which
has nothing to do with hermaphrodism (Cook, 1985;
Heilbrum, 1973; Singer, 2000; Stake, 1997; Woodhill &
Samuels, 2003).
The gender typologies referred to in this work emerged
when the viewpoint of masculinity/femininity underwent a
radical change at the beginning of the 1970s (Constantinople,
1973). Till then, this construct was represented as a bipolar
continuum: Masculine people could not be feminine or vice
versa, that is, the predominant viewpoint was the model of
congruence between sex (woman/man) and gender
(femininity/masculinity). From then on, the representation
would change to two axes that intersect, forming a right
angle (Bem, 1974; Spence, Helmreich, & Stapp, 1975).
Obviously, this orthogonality led to the establishment of a
fourfold typology: (a) persons (regardless of their apparent
sexual dimorphism) who scored high—above the median—
on the two independent masculinity and femininity scales
were classified as androgynous; (b) people (women or men,
indistinctively) who scored high on the masculinity scale
but low on the femininity scale—below the median—were
called masculine; (c) individuals who showed the opposite
pattern—high scores on the femininity scale and low on the
masculinity scale—were considered feminine; and (d) people
who scored below the median on both scales were called
undifferentiated. This fourfold typology was immediately
accepted, so that currently, in only three decades, there are
hundreds of works on this, as can be seen in any
bibliographic search, for example, in the PsycINFO database.
The theoretical basis of these scales is what Parsons and
Bales (1955) named the instrumental and expressive traits.
The question that comes to mind is: Why are these scales
called masculinity and femininity scales instead of
instrumentality and expressiveness scales? Till now, nobody
has seemed to want to answer this question rigorously. At
least partially, this may explain the amount of confusion
when referring to masculinity and femininity or even to
androgyny (high levels of masculinity and femininity in the
same person, regardless of his or her sex).
In this work, we start out from a theoretical model that
has already been elaborated (Fernández, 1988, 1996, 1998,
2000), in which the twofold sex and gender reality is
analyzed in detail. Sex refers to a complex reality rooted in
biology (sexual chromosomes, sexual hormones, internal
and external sexual organs, cerebral dimorphism) and that
inevitably leads to psychosocial development throughout
life (sexual assignation after birth, sexual discrimination in
the early years, sexual identity during infancy, sexual
redefinition in adolescence, sexual experience as an adult,
and sexual readjustment in old age). On the other hand,
gender is embedded in apparent sexual dimorphism, from
which human reflection elaborates identities, roles,
stereotypes, and specific gender asymmetries for each sex.
This model is clearly different from other currently
maintained points of view (Buss, 2004; Gergen, 2001). 
One of the most numerous group of researchers,
encouraged by the indubitable success of various feminist
movements, assumes that, whenever possible (except for
apparent sexual dimorphism and all it entails), sex should
be substituted by gender, given the negative connotations
of the term sex throughout history, basically because of the
flagrant injustices committed by men against women
(Kravetz & Marecek, 2001; Nicholson, 1997). Hence,
institutions such as the American Psychological Association
(2001) or the editors of many scientific journals— at least
in the area of psychology—request or even insist that authors
change the word sex to gender whenever the former appears
in their manuscripts. Perhaps one of the most illustrative
examples of this tendency is the fact that in 1995, in Beijing,
during the Fourth World Conference on Women, one of the
conclusions reached was precisely the need to substitute sex
with gender (Izquierdo, 1998). Constructivism is possibly
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the most representative scientific advocate of this viewpoint,
as it assumes the basic principle that most of the supposed
differences between men and women are a product of society
(Beall, 1993; Gergen, 2001; Gergen & Davis, 1997). 
On the opposite extreme are those who believe that we
may currently be undergoing a gender fad, but that the reality
of sex will eventually predominate, as it has been a
determining factor of the evolution of the species as such
and is still crucial for its maintenance and development
(Furedy, 2003). The scientific opinion underlying this
viewpoint, although not exclusive to it, comes from
sociobiology, which assumes that there are sound biological
reasons for considering men and women different in
significant aspects of their lives (Alexander, 1979; Betzig,
1999; Buss, 2004; Wilson, 1975). 
A third group comprises researchers who believe that
perhaps sex and gender could be used indistinctively, in
order to avoid the disputes of the former groups. The
scientific viewpoint that best represents this attitude is that
of researchers unspecialized in these issues, but who include
sex or gender as demographic or classification variables.
Thus, one of the most well-known psychology dictionaries
among the specialists has been forced to reflect this meaning
in its latest edition (Colman, 2001). 
Within the model of the twofold sex and gender reality,
an essential nucleus of the complex sexual reality is
comprised of sexual attraction. As current evaluation
instruments do not seem to adequately operationalize the
conception proposed in this model, a new questionnaire was
elaborated (Sexual Attraction Questionnaire; SAQ), which,
in view of the data, seems to have satisfactory psychometric
properties (Fernández, Quiroga, & Rodríguez, in press).
With regard to gender, over the second half of the past
century, the instrumental and expressive traits have become
a key piece in this complex reality. Several instruments have
attempted to operationalize these constructs although the
Bem Sex-Role Inventory (BSRI; Bem, 1974) has been the
one most frequently used by the international scientific
community despite the fact that, from the psychometric
viewpoint, it has some deficiencies (Fernández, 1983). With
regard to concepts, as pointed out by Spence (1991), and
as is obvious from the model employed herein, the claim
that the BSRI measures masculinity and femininity is hardly
justified. The most that can be said about the BSRI is that
it operationalizes the instrumental and expressive traits,
although in many of the studies, this is different from the
initial conception: Rather than the foreseen orthogonal
bidimensionality, a related multidimensionality emerges
(Choi & Fuqua, 2003). 
Our aim in the present work is to test two hypotheses
deduced from the proposed model. First, that the fourfold
typology derived from sexual attraction—(a) people attracted
to both sexes, (b) people attracted to men, (c) people
attracted to women, and (d) people apparently not attracted
to either sex—is not related, or is only very slightly related,
to the fourfold typology derived from the instrumental and
expressive traits—(a) instrumental-expressive people, (b)
instrumental individuals, (c) expressive people, and (d) non-
instrumental-expressive persons—which would confirm that
these typologies are two quite differentiated realities.
Second, that sexual attraction is closely related to apparent
sexual dimorphism, whereas the instrumental and expressive
traits have practically no relationship with sexual
dimorphism. 
Method
Participants
A total of 503 university students, 284 women and 219
men, with a mean age of 20.79 (SD = 3.7), completed the
two assessment questionnaires used in this study. Of these
students, 50.5% were 1st-year students, 19.1% were in their
2nd year, 15.5% were 3rd-year students, 12.9% 4th-year, and
2% were in their 5th year. They all belonged to various
centers of the University Complutense of Madrid. Most of
the students were studying the specialty of Teaching (57.1%),
18.1% were studying Pedagogy, 9.3% Medicine, 9.9%
Psychology, and 5.6% Political Sciences and Sociology. 
Instruments
The SAQ was employed to evaluate sexual attraction.
After the last refining, it is now made up of 16 elements,
8 referring to attraction to women and 8 referring to
attraction to men. The items are meant to operationalize a
whole series of aspects that apparently configure what is
commonly understood as sexual attraction (“In my gang,
they know that I am attracted to women,” “My friends think
that I like men,” “I like to think that men notice me,” “I
find some women TV presenters very erotic”). Each element
is rated on a 7-point Likert-type scale, where 1 stands for
the lowest degree of agreement with the content of the
item, and 7 indicates the highest degree of agreement.
Concerning the internal consistency of both scales
(Attraction to Women and Attraction to Men), the Cronbach
coefficient alpha values were .978 and .980, respectively.
Regarding construct validity, the factor analyses performed
supported the inversely related bidimensionality or bipolar
unidimensionality, which are empirically and conceptually
equivalent (for a more complete version of this instrument,
see Fernández et al., in press).
In order to evaluate the instrumental and expressive
traits, we used an instrument made up of the 12 best items
from Bem’s (1974) original scale, which has been the most
extensively used by the scientific community over the
decades of 1970 and 1980 (Beere, 1990). To select these
12 items, the following aspects were taken into account:
(a) the items appeared in the short version of Antill and
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alternative hypotheses do not seem to be correct: (a) the
hypothesis that defends the appropriateness of substituting
the term sex with gender, which is currently so fashionable
and extended, mainly represented by some constructionists;
(b) the opposite hypothesis, which states that gender is a
passing fad that should make room for the term sex, as
endorsed by some sociobiologists; (c) the hypothesis of
those not wishing to take sides, who assume that sex and
gender are equivalent; in general, assumed by researchers
who only use sexual dimorphism as a demographic or
classification variable because their real interests are quite
different from those related to sex or gender.
The data also provide sound support for the hypothesis,
derived from the model of the twofold reality of sex and
gender, of the close relationship between sexual dimorphism
and sexual attraction when the latter is evaluated by means of
two scales: Attraction to Women and Attraction to Men. The
studies performed to date confirm this view in contrast to other
viewpoints that have emerged, especially during the second
half of the 20th century, such as the Kinseyian hypothesis, the
orthogonality hypothesis, or the multidimensionality hypothesis.
Finally, the data also sustain the hypothesis of
independence between sexual dimorphism and the
instrumental and expressive traits. When we refer to these
four groups of persons as a function of gender—and more
concretely, as a function of the instrumental and expressive
traits—we are aware that very often the international literature
does not use this terminology, but instead masculine, feminine,
androgynous, and undifferentiated persons, as mentioned
previously. When choosing these terms (instrumentality and
expressiveness), we wanted to do justice to the historical
origin of the theory underlying the so-called “new masculinity
and femininity scales” (Bem, 1974; Spence et al., 1975). The
purpose of these scales was to overcome the crisis of the
classic model of masculinity/femininity, one of whose most
essential characteristics was that it was atheoretical. In other
words, it assumed the principle that the masculinity/femininity
construct was what was being measured by the scales
designed for that purpose. Thus, the essential feature of each
item of these scales was its capacity to differentiate
psychologically the sexes. Faced with this lack of theory,
and in view of the crisis of this classic model during the first
half of the 20th century, the authors of the new scales adopted
the instrumental and expressive traits as a basic theory to
elaborate their instruments. But why call something that is
actually instrumental and expressive “masculinity” and
“femininity”? The slightest convincing rationale for this
change has yet to appear. From the viewpoint of the model
proposed herein—the twofold reality of sex and gender—,
our goal is that the premises should be consistent with the
conclusion. If one begins with a theory of the instrumental
and expressive traits in order to elaborate new scales, it seems
logical to call these scales instrumentality and expressiveness
scales, and the current designation of masculinity and
femininity scales does not make much sense. Moreover, on
the basis of the model of this work, masculinity and
femininity should allude to other realities that are quite
different from the instrumental and expressive traits (for
example, all that have to do with body mental representation). 
We would like to underscore the independence between
instrumentality and expressiveness and sexual dimorphism,
regardless of whether or not considerable changes have been
observed in the percentages of men and women classified
in each of the four categories since the scales were designed
(in the mid 1970s) until the present. In fact, one can currently
observe a considerable increase in the number of people
who perceive themselves as instrumental-expressive and
expressive in comparison to three decades ago. However,
perhaps it is now time to attempt to find an instrument with
better psychometric properties than the BSRI and, of course,
one that is guided by a theory of instrumentality and
expressiveness that is more consistent than the one developed
during the mid 1950s. 
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